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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Kevin Hightower pleaded guilty to one count of 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and one count of possession of a firearm by 
a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The district 
court sentenced him as a career offender to 21 years and 10 
months of imprisonment, and Hightower appealed from his judgment 
of conviction and sentence.  We affirmed, but later granted 
rehearing to consider whether a defendant convicted of conspiracy 
to distribute a controlled dangerous substance is subject to the 
career offender provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.1 
Our review is plenary.  United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 
863 (3d Cir. 1992). 
I. 
 Section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines classifies a 
defendant as a career offender if: 
                     
1
 On appeal, Hightower argued that the district court erred 
(1) in determining that his state court convictions were not 
"related cases" for purposes of U.S.S.G. §4A1.2, (2) in deciding 
not to reconsider his selective prosecution claim, and (3) in 
declining to depart downward under U.S.S.G. §4A1.3.  We 
concluded, however, that these assertions were without merit. The 
statement in the commentary to section 4A1.2 that prior sentences 
separated by an intervening arrest are not considered related is 
not "inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that 
guideline," Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 
(1993); therefore, it is controlling, and Hightower's three 
convictions following separate arrests are not related under 
section 4A1.2.  Assuming his second claim is timely and not 
waived, the record below is insufficient to support a claim for 
selective prosecution, and we lack jurisdiction to review 
Hightower's third claim since the district court made a 
discretionary decision not to depart under section 4A1.3.  See 
United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95-97 (3d Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1661 (1993).   
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(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at 
the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant 
offense of conviction is a felony that is either a 
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, 
and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony 
convictions of either a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense.   
U.S.S.G. §4B1.1.  The question before us involves the second 
requirement, specifically, the scope of offenses that fall within 
the category of a "controlled substance offense."2  The 
commentary to section 4B1.1 states that: 
28 U.S.C. § 994(h) mandates that the Commission assure 
that certain "career" offenders, as defined in the 
statute, receive a sentence of imprisonment "at or near 
the maximum term authorized."  Section 4B1.1 implements 
this mandate.  The legislative history of this 
provision suggests that the phrase "maximum term 
authorized" should be construed as the maximum term 
authorized by statute. . . . 
U.S.S.G. §4B1.1, comment. (backg'd.) (emphasis added).  Based on 
this commentary, Hightower maintains that the definition of a 
controlled substance offense is circumscribed by the list of 
offenses enumerated in "the statute," 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)(1)(B), 
which does not include conspiracy to distribute a controlled 
substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.   
 Nevertheless, the commentary to section 4B1.1 also 
states that a controlled substance offense is defined in section 
4B1.2 which provides that: 
The term "controlled substance offense" means an 
offense under a federal or state law prohibiting the 
manufacture, import, export, distribution, or 
dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit 
substance) or the possession of a controlled substance 
                     
2
 Hightower was 24 years old at the time of this offense, and his 
prior state court convictions for possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute satisfy the third 
requirement.  
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(or a counterfeit substance) with intent to 
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. 
U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(2).  The commentary to section 4B1.2 expands the 
definition to include "the offenses of aiding and abetting, 
conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses."  U.S.S.G. 
§4B1.2, comment. (n.1).  Conspiracy to distribute a controlled 
substance is thus included as a predicate offense for sentencing 
under the career offender provisions of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  The question then becomes whether the Sentencing 
Commission exceeded its statutory authority by expanding the 
definition of a "controlled substance offense" beyond those 
offenses specifically listed in 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)(2)(B).   
II. 
 Unlike the guidelines themselves or policy statements, 
the commentary is not directly authorized in the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984.  See Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1917; 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 994(a)(1)-(2); U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A, §1.  In Stinson v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993), however, the Supreme Court 
addressed "the authoritative weight to be accorded to the 
commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines."  Id. at 1916.  Using 
the analogy of "an agency's interpretation of its own legislative 
rule," id. at 1919, the Stinson Court asserted that: 
[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets 
or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it 
violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is 
inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, 
that guideline.   
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Id. at 1915; see also United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 855 
(3d Cir. 1992) (comparing Sentencing Commission's commentary to 
administrative agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute).  
 Section 1B1.7 of the Sentencing Guidelines attributes 
the commentary with three different functions: 
First, it may interpret the guideline or explain how it 
is to be applied.  Failure to follow such commentary 
could constitute an incorrect application of the 
guidelines, subjecting the sentence to possible 
reversal on appeal.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  Second, the 
commentary may suggest circumstances which, in the view 
of the Commission, may warrant departure from the 
guidelines.  Such commentary is to be treated as the 
legal equivalent of a policy statement.  Finally, the 
commentary may provide background information, 
including factors considered in promulgating the 
guideline or reasons underlying promulgation of the 
guideline.  As with a policy statement, such commentary 
may provide guidance in assessing the reasonableness of 
any departure from the guidelines. 
U.S.S.G. §1B1.7.  The commentary at issue in Stinson was 
"interpretive and explanatory" of a portion of the career 
offender guideline and thus was controlling.  See 113 S. Ct. at 
1917-18.3   
III. 
A. 
 In this case, the statutory provision referred to in 
the commentary, 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), provides that: 
  (h) The Commission shall assure that the guidelines 
specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near 
the maximum term authorized for categories of 
defendants in which the defendant is eighteen years old 
or older and-- 
  (1) has been convicted of a felony that is-- 
                     
3
 The Stinson Court held that the commentary excluding unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a felon as a predicate offense under 
the career offender guideline was binding.  Id. at 1920.   
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  (A) a crime of violence; or 
  (B) an offense described in section 401 of 
the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 
841), sections 1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the 
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act 
(21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959), and section 
1 of the Act of September 15, 1980 (21 U.S.C. 
955a); and 
  (2) has previously been convicted of two or more 
prior felonies, each of which is-- 
  (A) a crime of violence; or 
  (B) an offense described in section 401 of 
the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 
841), sections 1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the 
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act 
(21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959), and section 
1 of the Act of September 15, 1980 (21 U.S.C. 
955a). 
The plain language of the statute thus requires the Sentencing 
Commission to assure that certain offenders receive maximum or 
near-maximum terms of imprisonment.  The problem is that a 
"controlled substance offense" is not explicitly defined in 
§ 994(h)(1)(B). 
 The legislative history states that the intent of 
§ 994(h) was to impose "substantial prison terms . . . on repeat 
violent offenders and repeat drug traffickers."  S. Rep. No. 225, 
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3358; see also United States v. Whyte, 892 F.2d 1170, 1174 
(3d Cir. 1989).  Furthermore, the Senate Report states that 
subsection (h) is "not necessarily intended to be an exhaustive 
list of types of cases in which . . . terms at or close to 
authorized maxima should be specified."  S. Rep. No. 225, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3359; see also Parson, 955 F.2d at 867. 
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B. 
 We have held that state court convictions can serve as 
controlled substance offenses under the career offender 
guideline, and that the Sentencing Commission has the authority 
to expand the scope of crimes of violence beyond the original 
congressional definition.  In United States v. Whyte, 892 F.2d 
1170 (3d Cir. 1989), the defendant contended that, for purposes 
of the career offender guideline, controlled substance offenses 
were limited to the federal statutes listed in 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) 
and did not include "convictions obtained under similar or 
analogous state statutes."  Id. at 1174.  Whyte rejected this 
argument, surmising that: 
If Congress had wanted only convictions under 
particular federal statutes to serve as predicate 
offenses, it could have said so quite simply.  Instead, 
Congress referred to 'offenses described in' -- not 
'convictions obtained under' -- those statutes. 
Id.  Additionally, the court reasoned that the purpose underlying 
§ 994(h) and the possibility of prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 841 
for the same conduct weighed in favor of counting the defendant's 
state convictions towards career offender status.  Id.  In United 
States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992), we concluded that 
§ 994(h) served "as a floor for the career offender category, not 
as a ceiling," id. at 867, and that § 994(h) did not bar the 
Sentencing Commission from including additional predicate 
offenses within the guideline definition of crimes of violence.   
 The Commission's authority to implement sentencing 
policy through the guidelines, however, is not coextensive with 
its authority to do so through commentary.  As discussed above, 
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the function of commentary is to (1) explain or interpret the 
guidelines, (2) suggest circumstances warranting departure from 
the guidelines and (3) provide background information on the 
guidelines.  In contrast, "[t]he guidelines provide direction as 
to the appropriate type of punishment -- probation, fine, or term 
of imprisonment -- and the extent of the punishment imposed." 
Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1917.  If "commentary and the guideline it 
interprets are inconsistent[,] . . . the Sentencing Reform Act 
itself commands compliance with the guideline."  Id. at 1918 
(citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4), (b)); accord United States v. 
Vea-Gonzales, 999 F.2d 1326, 1330 (9th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Mandarelli, 982 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1992).  The Supreme 
Court explained in Stinson that: 
Although amendments to guidelines provisions are one 
method of incorporating revisions, another method open 
to the Commission is amendment of the commentary, if 
the guideline which the commentary interprets will bear 
the construction.  Amended commentary is binding on the 
federal courts even though it is not reviewed by 
Congress, and prior judicial constructions of a 
particular guideline cannot prevent the Commission from 
adopting a conflicting interpretation that satisfies 
the standard we set forth today. 
113 S. Ct. at 1919 (emphasis added). 
C. 
 Although we have not addressed the question presented 
in this appeal,4 other courts of appeals have, reaching differing 
                     
4
 In United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1103, 111 S. Ct. 1002 (1991), we stated that 
"'crimes of violence' include the offenses of aiding and 
abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses."  
Id. at 86 n.6.  However, that case involved the Career Criminals 
Amendment Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), not section 4B1.2 of the 
9 
results.  In United States v. Price, 990 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 
1993), the court analyzed the applicability of the career 
offender provisions to a conviction for conspiracy to commit an 
offense against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371.  The Price court asserted that: 
Price clearly qualified as such [a career offender] 
under the definitions supplied by § 4B1.2 of the 
Guidelines and its Application Notes.  However, because 
the Sentencing Commission adopted §§ 4B1.1 & 4B1.2 
solely in an effort to fulfill the mandate of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(h), and § 994(h) plainly fails to reach 
conspiracies to commit controlled substance crimes, we 
vacate the sentence and remand the case to the district 
court for resentencing. 
Id. at 1368.  Although some courts had accepted without comment 
the commentary's inclusion of conspiracy as a controlled 
substance offense,5 the Price court concluded that the Commission 
had fashioned the career offender provisions "solely as an 
implementation of § 994(h)," and "acted explicitly upon grounds 
that do not sustain its action."  990 F.2d at 1369-70. 
                                                                  
Sentencing Guidelines, and the Preston court's interpretation of 
the guidelines was dictum.   
5
 See, e.g., United States v. Whitaker, 938 F.2d 1551, 1552 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (conviction for drug conspiracy in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 977 (1992); United States 
v. Jones, 898 F.2d 1461, 1462 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 838, 111 S. Ct. 111 (1990).  We note that other courts 
have simply relied on the commentary as support for including 
conspiracy and attempt as crimes of violence under the career 
offender guideline.  See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 11 
F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir. 1993) ("We hold that under the Guidelines 
an attempt is the same as the commission of the substantive 
offense."); United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1992) 
("conspiracy convictions can serve as predicate offenses under 
the career offender provisions of the federal sentencing 
guidelines"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1830 (1993); United States 
v. Guerra, 962 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1992) ("we should not 
deviate from a plain reading of the guidelines and their official 
commentary"). 
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Recognizing that the Commission may have discretionary authority 
under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) to specify long terms of imprisonment 
for defendants not specifically covered under § 994(h), the Price 
court nevertheless held that the commentary to section 4B1.1 was 
"beyond the Commission's authority under § 994(h)."  Id. at 1369. 
 In United States v. Heim, 15 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 1994), 
however, the court explicitly held that "the Sentencing 
Commission did not exceed its statutory authority in including 
conspiracy within the definition of 'controlled substance 
offense' in §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2."  Id. at 832.  The Heim court's 
reasoning was twofold.  First, it noted that "[n]owhere in the 
commentary to § 4B1.1 does the Commission suggest that it 
considered § 994(h) to be the sole legal authority for 
promulgating the career offender guidelines."  Id. at 832 
(emphasis added).6  Second, the Heim court asserted that "[t]he 
Commission's decision to go beyond the mandate of § 994(h) is 
also consistent with the legislative history to § 994(h)."  15 
F.3d at 832.   
 In United States v. Baker, 16 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1994), 
the court agreed that "§ 994(h) does not define the only crimes 
for which the Commission may specify a sentence at or near the 
maximum; it merely declares that the enumerated crimes must be so 
                     
6
 See also United States v. Mayes, No. 93-3342, 1994 WL 59469, at 
*2 (D. Kan. Feb. 15, 1994) ("mere mention of section 994(h), by 
way of commentary to section 4B1.1, does not make section 994(h) 
the sole authority relied upon by the Commission"); cf. Parson, 
955 F.2d at 867 (suggesting in dicta that Commission could rely 
on other statutory provisions besides § 994(h) as authority for 
the career offender guideline); Whyte, 892 F.2d at 1174 n.11 
(same). 
11 
treated."  Id. at 857.  The Baker court also expressed "serious 
doubts about Price's conclusion, derived solely from the 
commentary, that the only purpose of the career offender 
Guideline was to implement § 994(h)."  Id.  Finally, in United 
States v. Liranzo, 944 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1991), the court held 
that the defendant's prior conviction for the attempted criminal 
possession of cocaine was a controlled substance offense under 
the "plain language" of the commentary to section 4B1.2 of the 
guidelines.  Id. at 78.   
D. 
 We think that the commentary's expansion of the 
definition of a controlled substance offense to include inchoate 
offenses is not "inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous 
reading of" section 4B1.2(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines, and 
that it does not "violate[] the Constitution or a federal 
statute."  Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1915.  This commentary explains 
how the guideline should be applied, and we therefore hold that 
it is binding.  The commentary to section 4B1.1, however, is not 
explanatory or interpretive; rather, this commentary simply 
provides background information on the career offender guideline. 
We decline to interpret the commentary to section 4B1.1 in a way 
that is contrary to the text and legislative history of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(h), and which would nullify the commentary to section 
4B1.2.   
 
IV. 
12 
 For all these reasons, we will affirm Hightower's 
judgment of conviction and sentence. 
 
